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SANITIZING CYBERSPACE: OBSCENITY,
MILLER, AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC
DISCOURSE ON THE INTERNET
John Tehranian*
I. INTRODUCTION
Upon hearing the obstreperous thump of a man incessantly pounding his
bongo drums in the public park, writer Donald Barthelme once observed: "I hate
bongo drums. I started to tell him to stop playing those goddamn bongo drums
but then I said to myself, No, that's not right. You got to let him play his
goddamn bongo drums if he feels like it, it's part of the misery of democracy, to
which I subscribe."'
To be sure, the misery of democracy dictates that we tolerate viewpoints other
than our own, that we let people play the bongo drums, however begrudgingly.
But it is not merely for the misery of democracy that we protect the right of
individuals to pound the drums. Bongos can add to the richness of public
discourse. This simple but controversial proposition, as applied to obscenity
jurisprudence, is the focus of this Article.
From its very inception, obscenity jurisprudence in the Supreme Court has had
a troubled and "tortured history."2 Nevertheless, the Court has desperately tried
to enunciate a constitutional standard for obscenity that is consistent with the
First Amendment and that enables communities to safeguard morals by
* A.B., Harvard University, 1995;J.D., Yale Law School, 2000; Associate Professor, University
of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of Law. I would like to thank Owen Fiss, Lucy Fowler, and Daniel
Rosenthal for their helpful comments on this Article.
'Donald Barthelme, I Boughta itle Ciy, SIXTY STORIES 295, 296 (1982).
2 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973).
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proscribing certain forms of sexually explicit speech-a goal that has proven quite
elusive. Justice Potter Stewart preceded his infamous declaration, "I know it
when I see it,"3 with the concession that the obscenity category may be incapable
of "intelligibl[e]" definition. Stewart's formulation of obscenity was, by his own
admission, notoriously vague, and the ultimate constitutional standard adopted
by the Supreme Court-the Miller test-has not fared much better.
Enunciated by the Court in 1973, the Miller standard has remained the
definitive criteria for determining the constitutional permissibility of regulations
against certain forms of sexually explicit speech. To proscribe a particular work
without violating the First Amendment, a trier of fact must determine
(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.'
If the work satisfies all three criteria, it falls outside of the protection of the First
Amendment and can be censored by the state.
At the moment of its enunciation, the Supreme Court's modern obscenity
standard came under fire. In his dissent in Miller, Justice Douglas argued that
"Obscenity-which even we cannot define with precision-is a hodge-podge. To
send men to jail for violating standards they cannot understand, construe, and
apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated to fair trials and due
process."' The problem with the Miller standard, however, is far graver than even
Justice Douglas envisioned. From a libertarian perspective, the Miller standard
clearly violates the notion of individual autonomy and the concept of a strictly
limited government. But one need not fetishize the right to be left alone or
embrace a Kantian vision of the First Amendment,' based on the "right of each
individual to be treated as an end in himself, an equal sovereign citizen of the
kingdom of ends with a right to the greatest liberty compatible with the like
liberties of all others,"' to find fault with the Millerstandard. Milkrruns afoul of
3 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
4 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
5 Miller, 413 U.S. at 43-44 (Douglasj., dissenting).
6 See IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White Beck
trans., Bobbs-Merill, 1969) (1959); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE
(Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) (expressing Kant's influential idea that the individual should be treated as an
end, entitled to autonomy and dignity).
' Charles Fried, The New First Axendmentmrisprwdence: A Threat to Libev, 59 U. CHI. L. REv.
[Vol. 11:1
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a collectivist theory of the First Amendment,' which promotes the value of free
speech in producing a public capable of self-government and democratic
deliberation. By stark contract to the existing literature analyzing obscenity
jurisprudence, the principal focus of this Article is the conflict between Millerand
a collectivist vision of free speech.
The disjuncture between modern obscenity jurisprudence and the develop-
ment of a rich public discourse is of particular importance with the increasing use
of the Internet as an expressive medium. Regulation of content on the Internet
is well under way, and the direction that obscenity jurisprudence takes will play a
vital role in determining the richness of the public discourse in the cyberage. This
Article casts a particular eye towards the recent wave of legislation seeking to
regulate obscenity in cyberspace and towards two related Supreme Court
decisions: Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition9 and Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union."° As an analysis of these recent cases demonstrates, obscenity jurispru-
dence threatens to stifle the richness of public discourse by miring itself in the
same problematic standard that predated the cyberage: the Miller test. Conse-
quently, it is especially important that the courts and Congress begin to reconsider
the Miller standard and the very notion of obscenity regulation.
To this effect, Part II of the Article will attempt to deconstruct the Supreme
Court's current obscenity standard by demonstrating its fundamental disjunction
with the philosophical underpinnings of other First Amendment jurisprudence.
As I will argue, the Miller test contradicts the crux of free speech doctrine by
undermining the relative freedom of the realm of representation vis-i-vis the
realm of action, by abandoning a harm-based analysis for the regulation of
expression, by condoning viewpoint discrimination, and by violating a trust in the
individual that is essential to constitutional democracy. Part III will then make a
positive case against the Miller standard by subverting the test's tacit assumptions,
by revealing its increasing lack of workability, and by demonstrating the failure of
the Miller standard to conform to a collectivist theory of the First Amendment.
As I will argue, the sexual is political; consequently, the Miller test threatens to
remove vital matter from the public discourse. Finally, Part IV will demonstrate
by examining the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence on government regulation
of Internet content why a re-examination of Miller is particularly critical at this
time.
225, 233 (1992).
8 See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 268 (1995) (noting that Robert Post dubs
the Meiklejohn/Fiss perspective on free speech the "collective" theory).
9 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
'0 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
2003]
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II. THE CONTRADICTIONS OF OBSCENITY LAW: MILLER'S
INCONSISTENCIES WITH FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. BETWEEN REPRESENTATION AND ACTION
The fundamental disjuncture of modern obscenity jurisprudence from several
critical facets of First Amendment doctrine forms the crux of the negative case
against the Miller standard. To begin with, obscenity laws are based upon the
bizarre premise that sexually explicit expression is more dangerous than sexually
explicit action. As such, obscenity jurisprudence topples traditional First
Amendment values, which emphasize the importance of an expansive expressive
realm.
The First Amendment upholds the Enlightenment ideal that freedom of
expression is essential for the creation of a rich public discourse and for the
development of a democratic citizenry. As such, traditional free speech
jurisprudence has held that liberties in the realm of expression must remain
broader than liberties in the realm of action. This notion is true with respect to
all areas of expression, except for obscenity. While the law does prohibit certain
forms of sexual conduct, the sphere of sexual representation is even more
restrictive. As David Cole argues,
Central to the First Amendment tradition is the notion that one has
broader freedom in one's expression than in one's acts. When it
comes to sex, however, the rule is reversed. While sexual conduct
is far from unregulated, constitutional law permits more extensive
regulation of the public representation of sexual behavior than of
the behavior itself. As construed by the Supreme Court, the First
Amendment not only fails to protect representations of il/galsexual
conduct; it permits the state to criminalize the representation of
sexual conduct that is itself legal to engage in."
As a result, the law oddly suggests that there is something more dangerous about
the representation of sex than the act of sex itself-a most perplexing premise
indeed.
Far from representing an antiquated relic of Victorian times, this paradoxical
notion has gained increasing expression in the law. In 1996, Congress passed the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 ("CPPA"), 2 legislation that
n David Cole, Pl'ng 4y Pornography's Rules: The Regulation ofSexualExpression, 143 U. PA. L. REV.
111, 114 (1994) (emphasis in original).
11 18 U.S.C. § 2251, 2252, 2252A, 2256 (2000).
[Vol. 11:1
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proscribed media appearing to depict children engaged in sexual activity." Of
course, child pornography has fallen outside of the realm of First Amendment
protection ever since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in New York v.
Ferber." Noting the compelling state interest in the protection of minors" and the
intrinsic and inextricable link between the creation of child pornography and the
abuse of children, 16 the Court rationalized that crimes committed against real
children during the creation of child pornography justified its flat restriction.
However, the CPPA sought to do something else altogether-it made the
representation of sexual activity by performers who appearto be children criminally
punishable.'7 Thus, it was not the direct exploitation of children used to make
pornographic movies (a harm-based rationale for traditional anti-child pornogra-
phy legislation) that Congress had hoped to remedy, but the very representation
of such acts, whether real or not, simply because they manifested an evil idea.' 8
While the Ninth Circuit struck down the CPPA primarily on overbreadth and
vagueness grounds, 9 four circuits upheld the Act. "0  It therefore took the
Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coaktioni to ultimately strike
down the CPPA as unconstitutional. The consequences of the CPPA, had it been
held constitutional, are particularly disturbing. It would have been perfectly legal
for a couple of majority age to engage in sexual conduct; however, if their sexual
conduct were depicted in media of any kind and one of them appeared to be
under the age of eighteen, their activity would have been criminally punishable.
Moreover, such classic works as Lolita and Romeo andJulietwould have constituted
prohibited content under the CPPA.
" 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) (2000).
14 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
s Id at 756-57.
16 Id at 759.
17 18 U.S.C. % 2256(8), 2256(11) (2000).
" Ironically, the decriminalization of virtual child pornography could actually reduce the demand
for real child pornography. As Arnold Loewy argues,
]I]f virtual child pornography is (or can be made) nearly identical to real child
pornography and only the latter is unlawful, why wouldn't the pornographer sell
only the former? Certainly most pornographers would love to avoid the risk of
prison if their anticipated profit would not be compromised. And, from the
consumer's perspective, a virtual picture would also shield him from prosecution.
Arnold H. Loewy, Taking Free Speeh Serious_: The United States Suoprme Coma and Virtual Child
Pornograpiy, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA-CHAPEL HILL SCHOOL OF LAW, PUBLIC LAW &
LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER Series No. 02-17, at 9 (Nov. 2002).
Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 1999).
"0 United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d
645 (11 th Cir. 1999).
21 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
2003]
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Despite the Supreme Court's ruling, the passage and enforcement of the
CPPA signifies that, in the sexual realm, the law continues to seek to provide
individuals with greater freedom of action than of expression.
B. THE ABSENCE OF A HARM-BASED ANALYSIS OF OBSCENITY
At the same time, the Miller test eschews the traditional harm-based analysis
of other First Amendment jurisprudence. Unlike most areas of First Amendment
law, where courts balance potential societal harms with the constitutionally
protected interest in free speech, obscenity jurisprudence limits some sexually
explicit speech on the grounds of basic offense to moral values and community
standards. Ironically though, the Supreme Court has rejected the rationale of
moral offense as the basis for regulating free speech in a number of other areas,
including those where action is blurred by speech. Simply witness the flag
burning cases22 as well as Cohen v. California.23
Moreover, in other areas of unprotected speech such as malicious libel,
perjury, imminent incitements to violence and lawlessness, some form of tangible,
real-world harm justifies their proscription. Each of these proscribed forms of
speech conflicts with some other constitutional value, be it the rule of law, the
right to privacy, or the requirement of a fair trial. In the realm of child pornogra-
phy, there is a blanket restriction on such material precisely because "creation of
the speech is itself the crime of child abuse; the prohibition deters the crime by
removing the profit motive."'24 Thus, the regulation of the speech is directly
based upon underlying criminal conduct with a proven victim.
However, the regulation of obscenity does not rest on the demonstration of
real harm by the state. If any justification of sexually explicit speech is warranted,
it lies in the tangible, real-world harm model advanced by Catherine MacKinnon
and Andrea Dworkin in their work linking pornography to gender inequality and
oppression.
25
' See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (holding a Texas statute criminalizing the
discretion of venerated objects, including the United States flag, unconstitutional as applied to an
individual who had set such a flag on fire during a political demonstration since "the Government
may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable"); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990) (holding the Federal Flag
Protection Act of 1989 unconstitutional on similar grounds).
403 U.S. 15 (1971) (holding that the California statute criminalizing breach of peace was
unconstitutional as applied to an individual who wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft"
in a courthouse corridor since, inter aia, mere word offense at the language used was not was not
sufficient to warrant repression of the speech).
24 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 254.
2- See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); Andrea Dworkin, Against the
Male Flood. Censorship, Pornography, and Equality, 8 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1985); Catherine A.
[Vol. 11: 1
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The high irony of modern obscenity law and its disjuncture with other First
Amendment jurisprudence can be summed up with the following sampling of
case law: Nazis have a First Amendment right to terrorize the large Jewish
community and numerous Holocaust survivors in Skokie, Illinois;26 the Ku Klux
Klan has a First Amendment right to spread invective, hate, and a message
fundamentally at odds with the Fourteenth Amendment in Ohio and can freely
advocate "revengeance" against blacks and Jews, so long as their words do not
produce imminent lawless action;" and racists in St. Paul, Minnesota can burn
crosses and display Nazi swastikas as a means to intimidate and drive away non-
white members of the community since the city cannot pass an ordinance
proscribing such behavior;" but in some communities, a museum curator cannot
display a sexually explicit Robert Mapplethorpe photograph.
C. OBSCENITY AS A PROXY FOR VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION
Moreover, the Miller test inverts the traditional First Amendment view that
disagreement with a point of view is a reason to protect speech, not to censor it.
As David Cole argues, "ordinarily the fact that the majority finds particular speech
offensive is a reason to protect it; when it comes to sexual expression, however,
community offense is the justification for suppression." 29
According to the Miller test, potentially obscene speech with serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value is treated differently than speech without such
value. Defining such value, however, is a tricky proposition. Typically, judicial
and jury expeditions into this realm turn into proxies for viewpoint discrimination
without any justifications for such viewpoint discrimination based on overriding
harms.' Offense to community standards is a mere proxy for viewpoint
disagreement, and this is a violation of the bedrock principle: that one cannot
proscribe speech based on a disagreement with its message." For example, in
MacKinnon, Pornography, CivilRights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985); Catherine A.
MacKinnon, Not a MoralIssue, 2 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 321 (1984).
' Nat'l Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327 (1977); see also Coffin v. Smith, 447 F.
Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill. 1978), afid, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
27 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). But see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476
(1993) (drawing a sharp distinction between regulation of speech and conduct and enabling states
to issue more severe criminal penalties for racially-motivated acts of violence).
2 Cole, supra note 11, at 115.
'o See Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hale Speech and Pornography After R.A. 1/., 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 873
(1993); William B. Lockhart & Robert C. McClure, Literature, the Law ofObsceniy, andthe Constitution,
38 MINN. L. REV. 295 (1954); Geoffrey R_ Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-
Disimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 461 (1986).
" Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
2003]
7
Tehranian: Sanitizing Cyberspace: Obscenity, Miller,and the Future of Public
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2016
J. INTLL PROP. L
both Texas v. Johnson32 and Cohen v. California," offense to passers-by was not
recognized as a sufficient reason to suppress speech, even when it involved
something as emotionally invective as the burning of the flag or desecrating the
hallowed grounds of the judiciary. In fact, the statutes at issue in both Cohen and
Johnsonwere struck down precisely because they invoked viewpoint discrimination
under the vague guise of moral offense. One would logically imagine that with
respect to sexually explicit material, the prohibition against viewpoint discrimina-
tion would apply with equal vigor. However, this is simply not the case.
Admittedly, some theorists have disputed the claim that the obscenity standard
is a mere proxy for viewpoint discrimination. As they argue, anti-obscenity laws
adhere to the notion of viewpoint neutrality since they attack the harm caused by
the speech, not the viewpoint contained in it.34 However, two observations
shatter this illusion. First, as noted above, obscenity law is peculiar in that it
allows the proscription of the representation of an act, when the underlying act
itself remains legally permissible. Thus, barring a twisted argument that
representation of an action is more harmful than the action itself (a truly illogical
proposition), the current obscenity standard clearly does not consistently target
an underlying harm.
Second, the harm described in the obscenity standard is an offense to
community morality, which represents nothing more than community disagree-
ment with the message sent through the allegedly obscene speech. As Justice
Stewart argued, the constitutional guarantee of free speech "is not confined to the
expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by the majority."3'  But
unfortunately, the Miller test confines sexually explicit free speech to just
that-conventional messages shared by the majority. By emphasizing local
community standards, prurient interest, and a remarkably subjective test for value,
the Miller test essentially allows judges and juries to cloak their viewpoint
disagreement with a sexually explicit speech product in the guise of the obscenity
construct.
In the time since Mi//ets enunciation, the Supreme Court has tacitly acknowl-
edged some of the shortcomings in Mi/erby attempting to remove local standards
from the third prong of the Mi/kr test. In Pope v. I/linois,36 for example, the
majority gently tweaked the Mi/lertest by arguing that the literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value of a work should be judged by a reasonable person standard,
32 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 409-10
33 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971).
' See Kagan, supra note 30, at 878 (noting that a number of observers have made such a point).
See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW
212 (1987); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the FirstAmendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 612 (1986).
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959).
s 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
[Vol. 11: 1
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not by the standards of the local community in question." As even the state of
Illinois conceded in the proceedings, however, this alteration makes little
difference in the Milleranalysis: An individual juror's view of a reasonable person
standard will inextricably be tied with what she thinks members of her community
would find valuable.38
Voltaire's famous mantra, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to
death your right to say it,"39 encapsulates a cornerstone principle of First
Amendment jurisprudence. Obscenity law, as epitomized by the Miller test,
completely inverts this notion. As the Millertest dictates, a defendant has no right
to certain forms of sexually explicit speech precisely because a juror disapproves
of and takes offense to what he says.
D. THE RIGHT TO VOTE AT THE POLLING BOOTH, THE RIGHT TO VOTE IN THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Finally, the obscenity doctrine betrays any faith in the ability of individuals to
make decisions for themselves, another core principle of our constitutional
democracy and the First Amendment. As the ultimate tool of democracy, the
First Amendment ensures a robust public debate in order to facilitate individual
self-determination and sovereignty by the people. However, while our constitu-
tional democracy trusts individuals to make political decisions through the
exercise of the franchise, the obscenity standard does not trust individuals to vote
properly in the marketplace of ideas. As James Branit argues, "For a popular
majority or a court to say to an individual that she may not speak or listen to a
certain type of speech because that speech does not express valuable ideas is to
prevent that individual's self-fulfillment. '
Censorship is more insidious, however, than even Branit suggests: It also
handicaps the ability of individuals to make decisions for the body politic and
prevents them from practicing their skills in electing what to read and what not
to read. As Meiklejohn concludes,
[M]he authority of citizens to decide what they shall write and, more
fundamental, what they shall read and see, has not been delegated
to any of the subordinate branches of government. It is "reserved
I' d at 500-01.
3 Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The Regulation of Pornograpoy as Act and Idea, 86
MIcH. L. REV. 1564, 1580 (1988).
39 S.G. TALLENTYRE, THE FRIENDS OF VOLTAIRE 199 (1907), quoted in Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976).
0 James R. Branit, Recondiing Free Speech and Equaity: What Justifes Censorship?, 9 HARV.J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 429, 430 n.9 (1986).
2003]
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to the people," each deciding for himself to whom he will listen,
whom he will read, what portrayal of the human scene he finds
worthy of his attention.4
It is paradoxical to trust citizens to vote and decide on the political fate of their
nation but not to allow them to select the kind of arts and literature to which they
desire to expose themselves. Indeed, the daily practice that we, as citizens, obtain
in exercising our freedom in the economic marketplace and in the marketplace of
ideas-as expressed through arts and literature-prepares us for the biennial
exercise of our freedom at the voting booth.
III. OBSCENITY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: A COLLECTIVIST
REFUTATION OF THE MILLER TEST
As Part II demonstrates, the Miller test is fundamentally at odds with several
basic cornerstones of First Amendment jurisprudence. Together, these
contradictions form a significant negative case against continued use of the Miller
standard. The case against Miller, however, is much more compelling than this.
As an examination of the link between social structure and obscenity jurispru-
dence suggests, Miller does something much more insidious and damaging than
merely violating Kantian freedoms: Miller diminishes the richness of public
discourse by silencing voices at the margins and by empowering local communi-
ties to exercise a crippling heckler's veto.
A. THE SEXUAL IS POLITICAL
1. Ricb Public Disrcourse, Broadly Understood Wordsworth once stated that a
writer had not really achieved greatness until he or she was attacked as incompre-
hensible and pathetic. Wordsworth may well have added obscene to the list.
Much of the art we now consider to be part of the literary canon suffered through
a period of popular revulsion replete with cries of obscenity and calls for
censorship. Despite this humbling history of censorship gone awry, Roth, Miller,
and their progeny carry a tacit assumption that sexually explicit works are not
worthy of the full protection of the First Amendment. Even when declared non-
obscene, sexually explicit speech has faced significant constraints. 4 2 Following the
theory that the First Amendment exalts political and public policy discourse, some
41 Alexander Meildejohn, The FirstAmendmentIs anAbsolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245,262 (1961).
42 See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727 (1996);
F.C.C. v. Pac. Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976);
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
[Vol, 11: 1
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members of the Court have even subscribed to the notion of sexually explicit
expression as low value speech vis-i-vis core, political speech. Harry Kalven, Jr.,
for example, claimed, "The people do not need novels or dramas or paintings or
poems because they will be called upon to vote. Art and belles-lettres do not deal
in such ideas-at least not good art or belles-lettres."43 However, Kalven takes
too limited a view of the communicative impact of arts and literature in
developing the voter-citizen and in shaping values that eventually translate into
politics. As even Alexander Meiklejohn eventually acknowledged, forms of
literature and art can give voters "the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human
values [and] capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible,
a ballot should express."
44
Indeed, works falling into the category of obscenity as defined by Miller can
contribute to public debate and discourse and, as such, deserve core First
Amendment protection. ChiefJustice Burger wrote in the Millermajority opinion,
"to equate the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with
commercial exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the
First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for freedom.,
4 5
However, Burger's conception that obscene material is inevitably motivated by
commercial exploitation is far too narrow and uninformed; it ignores the impact
that allegedly obscene material can have in leading the way "toward sensitive and
informed appreciation and response to the values out of which the riches of the
general welfare are created."" Moreover, Burger and Kalvens' views are
subverted by the simple observation that the sexual is political.
2. Sex, CiviliZaion, and the Law. Our puritanical roots as a nation and our large
stake in the careful divide between the public and private spheres may cause us
to deny the essential truth to the claim that the sexual is political. Sexuality is an
inherent part of life, however, and inextricably finds itself tangled with political
matters. After all, the most politicized and hotly debated topics of the day often
4 Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 15-16 (1960).
4 Meildejohn, sapra note 41, at 256.
45 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15,34 (1973). Indeed, Burger was not troubled by the potential
chilling effect of the Miller standard on all forms of sexual speech, arguing that there was no
threat to genuine First Amendment values to have commercial porno-peddlers
feel some unease. For me the First Amendment was made to protect commerce
in ideas, but even at that I would go a long way concerning ideas on the subject
that has had a high place in the human animal's consciousness for several
thousand years. In short a little "chill" will do some of the "pornos" no great
harm and it might be good for the country.
BOB WOODWARD & ScoT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 203
(1979) (emphasis in original).
" Meildejohn, supra note 41, at 257.
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involve issues of sexuality," running the gamut from sex education, anti-gay
legislation, and anti-pornography measures to attacks on sexually-themed art,
debates over homosexuality in the military, and political rhetoric over family
values in national campaigns. In invalidating a state ban on a movie based on
Lady Chatterly's Lover, Justice Stewart wrote that the First Amendment "protects
advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than
advocacy of socialism or the single tax."4" This stance can be rationalized through
the simple observation that the sexual is indeed political and that sexual
expression can contribute to robust public debate.
Without delving too deeply into sociology, psychology, or philosophy, it is
instructive to point out the work of several authors in demonstrating this link and
the relevance of this work to the modem obscenity doctrine. Freud's master-
piece, CiviliZation and Its Discontents, asserts the view that sexual repression and
sublimation are necessary in order to build and maintain a civilization.49 It is
intriguing to note that current obscenity jurisprudence conforms to the Freudian
model of sexual repression by vigorously policing the public/private split and
carefully monitoring the flow of sexually explicit material into the public arena.
Curiously, obscenity in the home is immune from suppression,' but obscenity in
any other context remains subject to state regulation. Here, as David Cole points
out, "the Court's sexual speech doctrine functions less to permit the suppression
of sexual expression than to permit its repression from the visible 'public' sphere,
just as, in Freud's view, the psyche banishes unwelcome sexual thoughts to the
unconscious, but cannot extinguish them altogether.""1
Michel Foucault's The Histogy of Sexualiy further uncovers the links among
power, politics, and the construction of sexuality. As he argues, sexuality
is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive
reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which
the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasures, the
incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the
strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one
another.5 2
'7 Cole, ripra note 11, at 122.
Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959).
49 SIGMUND FREUD, CIVILIZATION AND ITs DISCONTENTS 64-74 (ames Strachey ed. & trans.,
1961).
so See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (asserting that individuals have a First
Amendment right to the private possession of obscene materials and that the state cannot criminalize
that possession).
"' Cole, sufranote 11, at 161.
52 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 105-06 (Robert
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Foucault points to the transformation in attitudes toward homosexuality from
ancient Greek civilization to contemporary society, noting the vast changes and
the accompanying political forces behind these changes. s3 The sexual is
inextricably political and sexually explicit material (obscene to some) can
constitute a part of the rich public discourse by calling attention to and decons-
tructing sexual norms and notions of propriety that form the underpinnings of
the political order of our society.
At this point, it is important to limit the scope of my argument. This Article
does not seek to claim that all sexually explicit material currently deemed obscene
is philosophically transcendent and enriching of the public discourse-far from
it. As Cass Sunstein correctly points out, "[m]any forms of pornography are not
an appeal to the exchange of ideas, political or otherwise; they operate as
masturbatory aids."'  Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that they "do
not qualify for top-tier First Amendment protection.""5  Indeed, the First
Amendment dictates that the state must allow some garbage to enter the public
sphere so that voters can determine for themselves what materials will help in
their quest to become fully actualized citizens and human beings. Hence, in the
area of incitement speech, both civil rights groups advocating conscientious
objection to segregation laws in the South and Ku Klux Klansmen denouncing
the notion of racial equality both enjoy a similar right to their speech, so long as
they do not cross the line and advocate imminent lawlessness.5 6 As repulsive and
repugnant as the views of Klan may be, without providing some leeway for the
littering of the public sphere, the state would suppress countless works of social
import and would damage the scope and vitality of public discourse.
As the Supreme Court determined in Schneiderv. State,7 a municipal ban on the
public distribution of leaflets represented a violation of the First Amendment,
despite the community's interest in minimizing litter cost. "We are of the opinion
that the purpose to keep the streets clean... is insufficient to justify an ordinance
which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to
one willing to receive it.""8
Simply put, litter is aprice wepayfor the First Amendment. As Justice Black noted
in his famous dissent in Feinerv. New York, 9 the state has an obligation to protect
Hurley trans., Vintage Books 1990) (1978), quoted in Cole, supra note 11, at 158.
s" 2 MIcHEL FOUCAULT, TH-E USES OF PLEASURE: THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert
Hurley trans., Pantheon Books 1986) (1984).
s4 Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 795, 807-08 (1993).
ss Id
s Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
57 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
58 Id at 162.
59 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
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an unpopular speaker from a heckler's veto, even when the cost of that protection
outweighs the cost of stopping the speaker. Cass Sunstein takes this argument
one step further, maintaining that citizens of any healthy republic should be
exposed to materials that they would not seek out, particularly in the information
age.' The digital revolution has provided individuals with the ability to perfect
customization of the content to which they are exposed." Despite the clear
benefits to the individual Internet user, such hyper-customization can constitute
a corrosive social force by increasing social fragmentation and limiting the
exposure of citizens to diverse points of view, including those to which they stand
diametrically opposed. 2 At worst, exposure to material that one would not
ordinarily seek may create some mild discomfort and irritation; however, it also
advances social pluralism and opposes anti-democratic tendencies toward
insularity. Thus, while sexually explicit material may offend the morals of some,
this is a cost society must bear in order to protect the diversity of the marketplace
of ideas and to ensure the robust public debate necessary for a functioning
democracy.
3. Behind the Green Door A Case Study. A simple example of obscenity
regulation may help to illustrate the crux of my argument in this Section. As a
means to denounce the obscenity standard, one could point to attempts to ban
Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter,3 James Joyce's Ulsses,6 or countless
other works now considered part of the literary canon.6" Abundantly cited in
countless law review articles, those works have become rallying cries for the anti-
Miller brigade. It has almost become truistic among the American cognoscenti
and legal elite to state that such works are entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion, and any attempt by a local community standard to deny them such
protection is unconstitutional."
60 CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLICCOM 9 (2001).
61 NicoLAs NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 153 (1995).
62 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 60, at 53. At the same time, of course, the Internet can serve as a
democratic tool in non-democratic countries by allowing users to access ideas that authoritarian
governments have successfully suppressed in other media and in democratic countries by allowing
groups with "rooms of their own" or private spaces in which they can develop and harness their
political message.
' See Lockhart & McClure, supra note 30, at 325 (stating, "In 1851, Nathaniel Hawthorne's The
Scaret Lentterwas bitterly attacked as an immoral book that degraded literature and encouraged social
licentiousness"); ALBERT MORDELL, NOTORIOUS LITERARY ATACKS 122 (1926) (describing the
attack on Hawthorne's The Scarlet Lette
.
" See United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934)
(holding that James Joyce's Ulysses was not obscene within the meaning of the Tariff Act of 1930).
65 For a seminal example of that argumentative strategy, see Lockhart & McClure, spra note 30.
But see Robert H. Bork, NeutralPnindples and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 29
(1971) (taking his argument to its logical conclusion and announcing quite honestly that Uysses falls
[Vol. 11:1
14
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol11/iss1/7
SANITIZING CYBERSPACE
But instead, I have chosen to defend a much more ordinary piece of
pornographic smut that no one would place in the literary pantheon. The work
in question is a film entitled Behindthe Green Door, a mundane pornographic work
made in 1972.67 One of the first widely distributed, sexually explicit movies,
Behind the Green Door generated $25 million in gross revenues for its producers,
San Francisco's Mitchell Brothers.6" Along with other sexually explicit works such
as Deep Throat, the film was shown during the early 1970s in many alternative
theaters and even on many university campuses, epitomizing the Zeitgeist of the
sexual revolution. In fact, the film was screened in its entirety at the Yale Law
School.69 At the same time, the film was the subject of numerous obscenity
prosecutions, most prominently in the South.7 °
Though otherwise insignificant, the movie contains a pivotal scene where a
stately and independent white female, played by former Hollywood actress and
Ivory Snow Girl Marilyn Chambers, has sex with a tribally-decorated African
male. The image was radical for the early 1970s and would still be radical today.
Putting the image into context, it is critical to note that it was not until 1967 that
the Supreme Court declared laws against interracial marriage unconstitutional.7
Meanwhile, it was only in 1968 that American network television broadcast the
first interracial kiss. The kiss, featured on the science fiction series Star Trek,
generated a storm of controversy by showing Caucasian Captain James T. Kirk
locking lips with African-American Lieutenant Uhura.
72
Even to this day, the mainstream media shy from depictions of interracial
relationships for fear of offending audiences.73 For example, in February 1993,
outside of the sphere of constitutional protection).
67 BEHIND THE GREEN DOOR (Mitchell Bros. 1972).
68 Porn in the USA, DAILY VARIETY, Aug. 13, 1986, at 27.
" See Ralph Gregory Elliot, The Private Lives of Public Servants: What Is the Pubic Entitled to Know?,
27 CONN. L. REV. 821, 824 (1995) (reviewingJANE MAYER &JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGEJUSTICE:
THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1994)). As an aside, one can only wonder who among the
early 1970s Yale Law student body, which included Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton and Clarence
Thomas, attended the screenings.
" See, for example, Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), which involved the November 1973
criminal prosecution of Claude Davis Ballew, the manager of the Paris Adult Theater, for screening
Behind the Green Door in the Deep South.
71 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that miscegenation statutes adopted by
Virginia to prevent marriages solely on the basis of racial classification violated the Equal Protection
clause and Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
72 Star Trek." Plato's Stepchildren (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 22,1968). It is quite interesting
to note that the show's writers cleverly couched the scene in the context of coercion and a dream-
like sequence in order to dampen the audience's shock. As the storyline of the episode goes,
powerful telekinetic forces gained control over the show's characters and dictated their "illicit"
actions. Nevertheless, protests ensued against the series.
"3 See, e.g., THE PELICAN BRIEF (eschewing any interracial romance between Julia Roberts and
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Pulitzer Prize-winning novelist Art Spiegelman created a furor with his call for a
reconciliation between the Jewish and African-American communities in New
York: On the cover of the Valentine's Day issue of the New Yorker, Spiegelman
broke a number of social taboos by depicting a Hasidic man kissing an African-
American woman.74 By contrast, Behind the Green Door broke the taboo against
miscegenation with gusto back in 1972, thereby presenting a vision that it was
acceptable for whites and African-Americans to socialize at the most primordial
of levels. Precisely because of its status outside of mainstream American culture,
its underground distribution, and its appeal to consumers not in the Moral
Majority, the pornographic industry was able to take on a subject shunned by
Hollywood and the broadcasting industry.
A cursory examination of Behind the Green Door and its depiction of interracial
sex may reveal little contribution to an enriched public discourse. Upon closer
examination, however, the link is imminently clear. Racial integration lay at the
heart of political debate in the United States during the 1950s, 60s and 70s. While
desegregation of the public sphere is a first step in eradicating racial boundaries,
true racial equality can only come about with a transformation in individual beliefs
and social patterns in the private sphere. Indeed, true racial integration will not
exist until socialization in the private sphere takes upon a racially neutral
character.
Consequently, Behind the Green Door provides a prime example of how the
Miller standard enables states and local communities to manipulate the First
Amendment exception for obscenity as a means to suppress ideas and prevent
challenges to the dominant social and racial paradigm. As Gey argues, "the
suppression of pornography [enables] the state [to] certify and enforce a moral
code that reinforces and justifies the political status quo."" Use of obscenity
regulation as a means to enforce a hegemonic moral code is inconsistent with the
notion of a free society aspiring to republican ideals of citizenship.
Denzel Washington when both the plot and the original book called for such a romance); The Dating
Game (syndicated television broadcast) (matching whites with whites, African-Americans with
African-Americans, Asians with Asians, and so on). Seegeneral Glenn Lovell, Interracial Romances.
In Holewooa, Love Is StillaMostly Segregated Thing, ATLANTAJ. CONST., Sept. 16,1994, at P11. To be
fair, however, some improvement has been made in this arena in recent years.
' For an account of this incident, see Radal Theme ofNew Yorker CoverSparks Furor, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 1993, at 12. Spiegelman meant the cover as a Valentine's Day card to New York City. As
he later recalled, "It was amusing that in a week in which 90 percent of the other magazines on the
stands had all these S&M covers, because that seems to be very dominant in our culture right now,
what got people most upset weren't whips and chains, but two people kissing." ArthurJ. Maginda,
Omt of the M ws' Trap?, BALTIMORE JEWISH TIMES, Jan. 20, 1995, at 43. Spiegelman's quotation
reveals the danger of a vague obscenity doctrine based on a notion of community offense.
'- Gey, supra note 38, at 1565.
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By banning Behind the Green Door, the state is perpetuating the centuries-old
taboo against miscegenation and reinforcing the moral underpinnings of the racial
segregation system. As a result, the state resorts to the Miller standard, which so
generously relies on community offense, to effect its code of racial oppression
and subjugation. Indeed, it is not surprising that obscenity prosecutions against
distributors of Bebindthe Green Doorcame mostly from the South, the region of the
country most embroiled in racial strife. Ironically, it is Behind the Green Doors
value as a political work that makes it so susceptible to censorship through the
Miller test. The film's direct challenge to sexual separation between the races was
the very thing that made it offensive to bigoted Americans everywhere, repugnant
to numerous community standards, and ultimately capable of being proscribed as
obscenity. To the juries that found the movie legally obscene, there was no
serious value to the content precisely because it showed a black man having sex
with a white woman, a representation wildly offensive to traditional American
values. Despite the wealth of law review literature on the subject of sexually
explicit films and specifically on Behind the Green Door, authors have neither
bothered to deconstruct the motives for prosecution under obscenity laws nor
have they challenged the traditional view that ordinary pornography makes no
contribution to an enriched public discourse.
B. LOCAL COMMUNITY STANDARDS: THE RACE TO THE BOTFOM
Several dangers to social structure also emerge from the grounding of the
Millertest in local community standards. First, as the case of Behindthe Green Door
reveals, leaving it up to community standards to determine what represents
obscenity is a bit like allowing local community standards to determine whether
separate is really equal. In the case of Behind the Green Door, negative feelings
about racial integration formed the basis for the offense to community standards
needed to substantiate an obscenity charge. More generally, relying on a small
community jury or the mostly elderly, white, and male judiciary to determine what
constitutes obscenity and what speech products individuals can and cannot access
is a dangerous game prone to viewpoint discrimination. As Justice Scalia has
noted, it is "quite impossible"76 to come up with an objective test to determine
literary or artistic value: "Just as there is no use arguing about taste, there is no
use litigating about it."77
Second, as cyberspace theorists have vigorously asserted, the increasing
globalization of information flows and the growth of the Internet make the use
76 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 504 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
7' Id. at 505.
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of local community policing standards obsolete.7" As the argument goes, the
Millercommunity standard has grown increasingly difficult to apply in recent years
with the explosion of the Internet as the dominant and most efficient means for
disseminating pornographic material. Indeed, there is a legitimate fear that the
continued use of a community standard test will result in individuals being
prosecuted by the standard of the most restrictive community with access to the
Internet, thereby chilling speech throughout cyberspace. After all, as the Supreme
Court held in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,79 "[t]here is no
constitutional barrier under Millerto prohibiting communications that are obscene
in some communities under local standards even though they are not obscene in
others.""0
Cybertheorists have framed this objection to the community standards
doctrine as an example of technology rendering the law obsolete, and courts have
begun to adopt this logic. For example, in Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties
Union,"' the Third Circuit ruled that the Supreme Court's prior community
standards jurisprudence "has no applicability to the Internet and the Web"
because 'Web publishers are currently without the ability to control the
geographic scope of the recipients of their communications."' 2 The problem with
local community standards, however, is hardly as novel as the courts and theorists
claim and hardly the product of features unique to the Internet. 3 Indeed, back
in 1954, Lockhart and McClure noted the dangerous impact of differing
community standards on the national marketplace of ideas by using the old-
fashioned example of book distribution."4 As they pointed out, most of the
publishing in the United States occurs in New York.
" For a general consideration of free speech issues on the Internet, see Cass R. Sunstein, The
First Amendment in Cberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757 (1995).
'9 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
'o Id at 116.
'" 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), and cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 399 (U.S.
Oct. 14, 2003) (No. 03-218).
82 Id at 180.
83 As an aside, a disproportionate amount of work by cyberlaw theorists has dealt with the issue
of pornography online and its potential censorship. As James Boyle quips,
This is rather like thinking that the most important feature of the industrial
revolution was that it allowed the mass-production--and then the regulation-of
pornographic magazines. Given the magnitude of the changes occurring, and
the relatively small differences between pornography on-line and pornography
anywhere else, a more trivial emblematic concern would be difficult to find.
James Boyle,A Politics ofIntellectualProperty: Envirnmmentafismforthe Net?, 47 DUKEL.J. 87,89 (1997).
' Lockhart & McClure, supra note 30, at 389-90.
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But whether the publisher is in New York, or in some other state,
prosecution of the publisher in the state of publication gives that
one state the power to limit the books that will be available
throughout the entire United States. Furthermore, apart from
nation-wide control of reading material by the state of publication,
censorship in an important area of distribution sometimes causes
out-of-state publishers to revise or reject manuscripts before
publication, thereby interfering on a national scale with freedom to
read.8 s
Thus, individuals hoping to engage in national distribution of a speech product
must kow-tow to the most stringent community's standards lest they be
prosecuted for violation of obscenity laws.
Admittedly, however, the growth of the Internet has magnified the problem
with an obscenity doctrine rooted in community standards. In cyberspace, it takes
little effort to engage in national or even international distribution. In fact,
anything posted on the World Wide Web becomes immediately accessible to users
around the globe. By grounding obscenity standards at the local level-whether
by local jurors applying local standards or by local jurors purportedly applying
national standards-the Millertest enables the most restrictive county in the most
restrictive of states to dictate the kind of speech products available throughout the
national, or even international, market. In short, Miller's community standards
test represents a heckler's veto of the grandest order by providing a local
sovereign with an unwarranted level of power to wield on the minds and thoughts
of individuals outside of its jurisdiction. As Lockhart and McClure rightfully
concluded more than thirty-five years ago, "The right of citizens of the United
States to choose what they shall read should not be at the mercy of the courts of
any one or a few states. Literature is international in scope, and should never be
controlled by narrow, local standards."
8 6
C. OBSCENITY AND VOICES AT THE MARGINS
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the obscenity doctrine presents a
hegemonic and unitary vision of the transmission of ideas that views the white
male elite discourse as the sole means of expression protected under the First
Amendment. As a result, the obscenity doctrine has become a dangerous
mechanism for the Moral Majority to silence the voices of those at both the
sexual and racial margins of society.
L &d
~'Lockhart & McClure, supra note 30, at 390.
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As Owen Fiss argues, egalitarian considerations play a vital role in any First
Amendment analysis, for there is a need to "enhanc[e] the power of the poor,
put[] them on a more nearly equal political footing with the rich, thus giv[e] them
a fair chance to advance their interests and enact measures that will improve their
economic position.""s Though this passage refers to Fiss's call for electoral
campaign reform, the logic carries over to other First Amendment issues. As Fiss
puts it, "At the core of my approach is a belief that contemporary social structure
is as much an enemy of free speech as is the policeman."8 " In its current form,
obscenity doctrine contains a tremendous class, race, and sexual bias.
The obscenity doctrine presumes that the transmission of ideas cannot come
in a sexually explicit modality. This erroneous assumption can be traced all the
way back to the modem founder of First Amendment jurisprudence, Zechariah
Chafee. As he noted, the true explanation for the crimes of obscenity and libel
is, that profanity and indecent talk and pictures, which do not form
an essential part of any exposition of ideas, have a very slight social
value as a step toward truth, which is clearly outweighed by the
social interests in order, morality, the training of the young, and the
peace of mind of those who hear and see. 9
Consequently, there is a dominant belief that worthwhile ideas come only in a
single form-the Queen's English. The imperialistic and anti-egalitarian
consequences of such a vision are alarming.
Different socioeconomic groups, different cultural groups, and different sexual
groups express themselves in different ways. Rap music, for example, is the
sound of the street. It may lack eloquence to an upper-middle class, educated
white male from New England, but that does not mean that it lacks content. To
millions of individuals confronting the harsh realities of ghetto life every day, the
sexually explicit and violent themes of rap music not only form a cathartic outlet
for their pain, suffering, and anger, but also carry a weighty protest against the
failed promises of the American Dream. Unfortunately, however, rap's lack of
subjective eloquence is frequently conflated with a lack of content. As a result,
rap music has come under heavy fire and suffered from obscenity prosecution.
For example, the African-American rap group 2 Live Crew found itself convicted
87 OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONYOF FREE SPEECH 11 (1996).
88 Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Sodal Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1416 (1986).
89 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE,JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 170-71 (1920).
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of violating a Florida obscenity statute for a concert performance," and an
Alabama record store owner was prosecuted for selling a 2 Live Crew record.9,
Obscenity jurisprudence's recognition of a single modality for the transmission
of ideas also leaves little room for the constitutional protection of much
contemporary art. As Amy Adler persuasively argues, "serious value is no longer
a coherent standard in the face of recent developments in art," 2 especially in the
Postmodern movement which seeks to subvert embedded notions of seriousness
and value. Yet again though, the obscenity doctrine enables censorship of
individuals at the margins of society by placing their art outside the sphere of
constitutional protection.
In practice, obscenity law enforcement has become an effective mechanism
to purge the transmission of ideas that society does not like-ideas that are non-
white, non-heterosexual, and non-traditional. Thus, obscenity law has become a
powerful tool for the dominant social structure to silence its critics. It is hardly
a coincidence that ethnic and sexual minorities have been the most prominent
targets of obscenity law enforcement in the United States over the past several
years. Gay and lesbian artists such as Robert Mapplethorpe, David Wojnarowicz,
Todd Haynes, Marlon Riggs, John Fleck, Holly Hughes, and Tim Miller as well
as African-American musicians such as 2 Live Crew have borne the brunt of the
prosecutions.93 These are precisely the groups who receive the least exposure and
voice through the mainstream media. Yet, when they express themselves and
educate the public about the issues important to them, they are prosecuted under
the guise of obscenity law. In recent years, these voices at the margins have found
limited refuge in the anarchic realm of cyberspace, but there is little reason to
doubt that the new wave of legislation regulating cyberspace will be used to
silence these voices once again.
o A federal trial judge found the music legally obscene, but the judgment was ultimately
reversed by the Court of Appeals. See Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134 (11 th Cir. 1992)
(holding that sheriff failed to carry his burden, even by a preponderance of the evidence, that music
recording was obscene by Mi/kr standards).
91 Though a municipal judge found the defendant guilty, he was ultimately acquitted. MARJORIE
HEINS, SEX, SIN, AND BLASPHEMY: A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S CENSORSHIP WARS 77 (1993).
92 Amy M. Adler, Note, Post-Modem Art and the Death of Obscenity Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1359, 1362
(1990).
9' See Cole, supra note 11, at 133-35.
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IV. THE EMERGING BATTLE OVER SEXUALLY EXPLICIT CONTENT IN
CYBERSPACE: ASHCROFT V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION AND THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACT
With the enunciation of the Miller test in 1973, the Supreme Court hoped to
extricate itself from the tortuous task of obscenity regulation by enunciating an
ostensibly clear standard upon which lower courts could rely.94 In part, the
Supreme Court was successful, dramatically reducing the number of obscenity
cases in its docket in the decades that followed Miller.95 With the emergence of
the Internet as the most powerful tool for economic, political, and social change
that the world has ever known, however, the calls for careful regulation of the
medium have grown increasing forceful. In the arena of obscenity, Congress has
begun to respond to these calls, seeking to sanitize cyberspace for the American
public with such statutes as the Communications Decency Act ("CDA"),06 the
Child Pornography Prevention Act ("CPPA"),97 and the Child Online Protection
Act ("COPA").8 Each of these efforts directly implicates the Millerdoctrine, and
as the Supreme Court's opinion in Ashcmft v. American Civil Liberties Union99
reveals, the Miller test may dictate the shape of discourse on the Internet in the
coming years. Thus, a reexamination of Milleris of particular importance at this
historic juncture.
'9 In part, some of the Justices had apparently grown tired of infamous weekly screenings of
pornography on their regular calendars. See BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN 198-200(1979). As ChiefJustice Burger argued, "iln the long run this Court cannot act
as an efficient Super Censor, and the sooner we leave the problem to the states the better off we and
the public will be." Id at 201. Of course, leaving the problem to the states has its own dangers.
95 Following a rash of cases clarifying the Court's obscenity jurisprudence in the immediate wake
of Miller, see, e.g., Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Ward v. Ilinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977);
Splawn v. Caifornia, 431 U.S. 595 (1977); Ernojk v.Jarksontile, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Halrng v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973), few cases involving obscenity issues made it to the Court in the intervening years
between Milltr and the recent wave of cyberspace-related cases. Some notable exceptions, however,
include Sable Communications of Cal, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989), Pope v. Illnois, 481 U.S. 497
(1987), New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), and FCC v. Paifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
9 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000).
91 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000).
9' 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
99 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
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With Ashcroft v. American CivilLiberties Union,"° COPA became the first major
online content-regulation statute to successfully withstand Supreme Court
scrutiny."' As the Supreme Court's opinion inACLUindicates, Milleris alive and
well, and its application to cyberspace threatens to dramatically constrict the
richness of public discourse on the vibrant Internet.
COPA's stated goal is to protect minors from harmful (allegedly) commercial
content on the World Wide Web."°2 In so doing, the Act carefully mirrors the
language of the Millertest but with one significant change: COPA judges content
from the viewpoint of an adult ascertaining the appropriateness of material for a
minor. Thus, online content may be proscribed under COPA if it (1) appeals to
the prurient interest of minors, (2) deals with patently offensive sexual conduct
with respect to minors, and (3) lacks value for minors. 0 3 The statute then
provides a series of affirmative defenses to those subject to prosecution. A
potential defendant can avoid the civil and criminal penalties contained in COPA
by demonstrating that she made a good faith effort to restrict access by minors
to the harmful content by utilizing credit card requirements, digital certificates,
and other related technology."°
Initially, the Third Circuit' held that COPA's reliance on local community
standards to determine whether material on the World Wide Web was "harmful
to minors" violated the First Amendment. As the Circuit noted, COPA thereby
imposed "an impermissible burden on constitutionally protected First Amend-
ment speech."'0 6 The Supreme Court reversed that decision, however, and held
that the use of community standards to identify material harmful to minors did
not render COPA facially unconstitutional. °7 The Supreme Court thereby
reaffirmed the vitality of the Miller standard and its reliance on local community
100 lId
101 The overall constitutionality of the statute, however, was not before the Supreme Court.
Rather, the Supreme Court only found that reliance on local community standards to regulate
Internet content was not facially unconstitutional.
'02 See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (a)(1) (2000) (noting that COPA prohibits any person from "knowingly
and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of
the World Wide Web, mak[ing] any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any
minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors").
103 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6) (2000).
104 47 U.S.C. § 231 (c)(1) (2000).
'05 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated, 535 U.S. 564 (2002), and cert. granted, 124
S. Ct. 399 (U.S. Oct. 14,2003) (No. 03-218).
06 Id at 166.
107 535 U.S. 564, 566 (2002).
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standards to determine obscenity." As the Court argued, the Internet is not
fundamentally different enough from prior forms of communication to warrant
a unique standard for regulation of its content.
B. SANITIZING CYBERSPACE: COPA, EXPRESSIVE FREEDOM, AND THE RICHNESS
OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE ON THE INTERNET
Although the Court reversed the Third Circuit by a vote of eight to one, there
was a vigorous debate over one particular red-herring issue: whether a national
or local community standard should apply for determining if online content is
harmful to minors. Specifically, Justices O'Connor and Breyer advocated a
national standard to avert the broad chilling effect that would result from the local
standards of the most restrictive community.' °9 By contrast, Justices Thomas,
Scalia, and Rehnquist downplayed the chilling effect of the local community
standard."' As they carelessly suggested, communicators will simply have to rely
on other media-media where the reach of the message can be geographically
limited by the communicator-in order to avoid having their speech judged by
the least tolerant community."' Only Justice Stevens, in his dissent, noted the
irrelevance and futility of this debate since jurors "instructed to apply a national,
or adult, standard will [still] reach widely different conclusions throughout the
country.""' 2 Moreover, given the profoundly subjective nature ofwhat constitutes
offensive and harmful content, determining a national community standard is
impossible. Thus, communicators on the World Wide Web will still have to
adjust their message to conform to the standards of the least tolerant communi-
"10 On remand, the Third Circuit again found COPA to be unconstitutional for failing to pass
strict scrutiny. That decision was appealed to the High Court, which granted certiorari this fall.
ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003), cert.,granted, 124 S. Ct. 399 (U.S. Oct, 14,2003) (No.
03-218).
" See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 586-89 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 589-91 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring).
... Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
t This position goes against the grain of First Amendment jurisprudence in the area of content-
neutral time, place, and manner regulations of public fora, which requires that regulators provide
those who wish to engage in protected expression with an alternative means of communication. See,
e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,791 (1989) (holding that municipal noise regulation
designed to ensure that music performance in band shell did not disturb surrounding residents, by
requiring performers to use sound system and technician provided by city, did not violate free speech
rights of performers). The Court's poorly reasoned suggestion that communicators simply rely on
other media is particularly ironic in light of the Court's own admission that the Internet represents
a unique medium for expression: "The Internet... offer[s] a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual
activity." See Ash croft, 535 U.S. at 566 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3)).
112 Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 607 n.3 (StevensJ, dissenting).
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ties, and these communities will possess a heckler's veto that casts a chilling effect
on free speech in cyberspace.
Even more significantly, by focusing its attention on the debate over local
versus national community standards, the Court ultimately failed to examine the
more pressing and fundamental questions governing the regulation of obscenity
and the future of public discourse on the Internet. For instance, the Court failed
to fully recognize the overbreadth of the COPA regulatory scheme. In order to
rationalize its decision to reverse the Third Circuit and deny the facial challenge
to COPA, the Court needed to distinguish COPA from the CDA, which was
struck down as unconstitutional in Reno v. American CivilLiberties Union."3 In Reno,
the Court condemned the CDA because the breadth of its coverage was "wholly
unprecedented." '114 By failing to define the terms "indecent" and "patently
offensive," the statute "cover[ed] large amounts ofnonpomographic material with
serious educational or other value."' "
In Asbcrofit v. American Civil Liberties Union,"6 however, the Court failed to
recognize that the language of COPA suffers from similar shortcomings.
Although COPA does not proscribe material that, taken as a whole, has literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value, that value is judged only with respect to
minors."' Consequently, non-pornographic materialwith serious educational and
other value for adults would still be capable of proscription under the statute.
The deleterious impact of COPA on the richness of public discourse is
demonstrated by examining the types of educational material that it might
proscribe. Materials that some consider harmful to minors-including the
dissemination of information on contraceptives, abortion, and sexual orienta-
tion-may be banned by COPA, particularly given the statute's loose definition
of what constitutes a communication made for commercial purposes. COPA
ostensibly regulates only commercial communications on the World Wide Web."'
The statute provides, however, that a person "shall be considered to make a
communication for commercial purposes only if such person is engaged in the
business of making such communications. '  Someone who is "engaged in the
business" is then defined as a person who
"1 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
114 Id at 877.
115 Id.
116 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
117 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(6) (2000).
11 See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (a)(1) (2000) (noting that COPA prohibits any person from "knowingly
and with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or foreign commerce by means of
the World Wide Web, mak[ing] any communication for commercial purposes that is available to any
minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors").
19 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(2)(A) (2000).
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devotes time, attention, or labor to such activities, as a regular
course of such person's trade or business, with the objective of
earning a profit as a result of such activities (although it is not necessay
that the person make a profit or that the making or offering to make such
communications be theperson's sole orprincipal business or source of income).'2
With such an expansive definition of commercial activity and with the use of
Miller's community standards test, COPA could easily be used by the pro-life
movement as a means to silence the activities of groups such as Planned
Parenthood, which provides reproductive advice and sells contraceptives to
minors. This possibility reveals the danger of an obscenity standard based upon
the tenets of the Milkr test because it would lead to a limiting of the public
discourse on the important political issue of reproductive freedom. Moreover,
it would regulate the vigorousness of this debate in the medium (the Internet)
most conducive to communications with teenagers, the group arguably most in
need of information on reproductive issues.
Despite this fact, the Court eschewed charges of overbreadth by proudly
noting that the Miller standard, as incorporated in COPA, excludes material of
serious value to minors.' As the Court confidently declared, the test for serious
value is based upon a national standard, and " 'the value of [a] work [does not]
vary from community to community based on the degree of local acceptance it
has won.' "12 This problematic assertion fails to note how inherently subjective
the notion of value is. One need look no further than the history of obscenity
jurisprudence itself to recognize the error in this view. Across time, legal history
is rife with examples of works that were condemned for lacking any redeeming
value; many of these works are now considered seminal classics of the highest
value. Across space, one community may view a work of art as utterly worthless
and offensive while, at the very same time, another community may view that
work of art as sublime and precious. It is therefore impossible for a national
arbiter to reasonably determine the social value of the work.
Additionally, in its contemplation of COPA, the Court declined to determine
if judgment by community standards, whether national or local, constitutes
viewpoint discrimination per se and therefore renders the Miller standard an
affront to other First Amendment jurisprudence. This is a vital point since
proscribing speech for offending community standards is tantamount to
condemning that speech because it expresses a viewpoint denounced in the
1- 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(2)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
121 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 579 (2002); see also 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(6)(C) (2000)
(codifying the Milkr standard).
12 See Ashcrofl, 535 U.S. at 579 (quoting Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987)).
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community. In other words, Milles determination of offense to community
standards is a direct proxy for what viewpoints a community condemns. Thus,
any speech proscribed by the Miller test is being proscribedpreisely because of the
viewpoint it expresses. This is a startling violation of a bedrock principle in First
Amendment jurisprudence.
Finally, in the ACLU decision, no Justice questionedwhy obscenity was even
proscribed as a category in the first place, and no Justice addressed the fundamen-
tal disjuncture between modern obscenity law and the harm-based analysis of
other First Amendment jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, the various opinions of
the Court failed to analyze the impact of obscenity prosecution on social
structure, the use of obscenity laws to silence minority viewpoints, or the
importance of works deemed "obscene" to enriching the public discourse.
Without that analysis, the deleterious impact of Miller remains shrouded in vague
notions of offense, irrelevant debates over the use of national versus local
community standards, and politically motivated cries to protect the children.
V. CONCLUSION
As this analysis of COPA reveals, it is high time to lay the Miller standard to
rest. Perhaps it is time to address the real harms that may stem from certain
forms of sexually explicit material and require a Brandenburg-like standard of direct
and imminent incitement to lawlessness for their proscription. 23 With respect to
pornography, it may be time to move toward a tort and criminal model of
regulation that punishes actual offensive conduct related to pornography, not the
speech itself.124 Whatever the solution, the death knell of Millermust sound.
With its recent re-emergence, Miller threatens to have a profound role on the
future of free expression on the Internet. By granting local communities a
heckler's veto to censor speech nationwide and by acting as a mechanism for
dominant powers to silence the voices of sexual and racial minorities, the test is
fundamentally incompatible with First Amendment jurisprudence and has an
adverse impact on the richness of public discourse. Quite simply, continued use
of the Miller test undermines the very democratic and collectivist ideals that the
First Amendment seeks to protect-in real space, cyberspace, and beyond.
" See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding Ohio criminal statute, which by its
own words and as applied, purported to punish mere advocacy to violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
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